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Heterogeneity in loss aversion: evidence from field elicitations

Structured Abstract
Purpose: Prospect theory is now widely accepted as the dominant model of choice under
risk, but has not been fully incorporated into applied research because of uncertainty
about how to include population-level parameter estimates. We aim to characterize
heterogeneity across people to lay a foundation for future applied research.
Methodology: We use elicitation data from field experiments in Vietnam to fit a finite
Gaussian mixture model using the Expectation Maximization algorithm. Applied results
are simulated for investment allocations under myopic loss aversion.
Findings: We find that about 20% of our sample is classified as extremely loss averse,
while the rest of the population is only mildly loss averse. This implies a bimodal
distribution of loss aversion in the population.
Research limitations: The data set is only moderately sized: 181 subjects. Future
research will be needed to extend these results out of sample, and to other regions.
Value: This paper provides empirical evidence that heterogeneity matters in prospect
theory modeling. It highlights how policy makers might be misled by assuming that
average prospect theory parameters are typical within the population.
Keywords: behavioral economics, expectation maximization, Gaussian mixture model,
heterogeneity, loss aversion, prospect theory
JEL Codes: C38, G02
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Introduction
Loss aversion is the widespread behavioral phenomenon in which individuals feel losses
more strongly than equal-valued gains. It is a key piece of Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) Nobel-prize winning Prospect Theory, and it explains apparent small-scale risk
aversion that is otherwise impossible to reconcile with expected utility models (Rabin,
2000). Despite widespread acknowledgement of the importance of loss aversion in
behavioral modeling of risky choice, precious little is known about how loss aversion
varies across individuals at the population level. Common practice in studies estimating
loss aversion (or prospect theory parameters, generally) is to report mean values and
standard errors, and possibly the standard deviation or interquartile range, but not to
focus on the large amount of variability across people (cf. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon, 2008; Tanaka,
Camerer, and Nguyen, 2010; Liu, 2013).
In this article, we estimate a finite Gaussian mixture model to characterize
population-level variation in estimated prospect theory parameters, using data from the
field experiments of Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) with villagers in Vietnam. We
find strong evidence in favor of a parsimonious, 2-component mixture model. Our key
finding is that approximately 20% of subjects are classified as extremely loss averse,
whereas the remaining majority of the population has milder loss aversion than
commonly reported estimates would suggest. In fact, the mixture model allows us to
clearly demonstrate that the population-average loss aversion is in no way typical: it is
1.29 standard deviations above the mean for the majority group, and 5.32 standard
deviations below the mean for the extremely loss averse group.
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This finding casts serious doubt on the usability of existing parameter estimates
for applied modeling. We demonstrate this fact in a numerical exercise highlighting the
effect of loss aversion on investment decisions, calibrated to the myopic loss aversion
model of Thaler, Kahenman, Tversky, and Schwartz (1997). Our simulations highlight
how failing to model loss aversion heterogeneity correctly can lead to mistaken policy
conclusions, because the counterfactual of a single-component mixture model implies
that far too large a share of the population is moderately loss averse. In particular, we
show that policy interventions aimed at reversing the detrimental effects of loss aversion
on investors will be highly effective at low levels of intervention, but that the extremely
loss averse group will resist treatment at higher levels than expected. These findings
suggest that incorporating loss aversion heterogeneity will be a critical piece of future
applied prospect theory models.

Background
Expected utility models traditionally do a poor job predicting true human behavior in
many settings, particularly finance and risk management. As a result, there has been a
growing push in economic and financial modeling to incorporate advances from the field
of behavioral economics, closely accompanied by a large and growing body of evidence
demonstrating the improvements obtained by incorporating such elements into consumerchoice models (Chetty, 2015; Madrian, 2014). One of the most prominent contributions
of the behavioral literature has been the development of cumulative prospect theory
(CPT). These advances include the incorporation of reference-dependent risk preferences,
loss aversion and rank- and sign-dependent probability weights into a model of risky
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choice. Despite its recognition as generally improving upon the expected utility model,
utilization of the cumulative prospect theory model has only recently found its way into
the agricultural economics literature. For example, Babcock (2015) and others (Du et al.,
2014; Bougherara and Piet, 2014; Bocquého et al., 2014) have used cumulative prospect
theory to explain anomalous crop insurance coverage choices and provide
recommendations for improved insurance and policy design.
To fully capture the potential benefits of incorporating prospect theory into
financial/risk modeling, however, researchers must have a strong understanding of how
the relevant behavioral parameters are distributed at the population level. Naïvely
assuming that these parameters are normally and independently distributed can prevent a
model from accurately capturing the true distribution of economic behavior. Despite the
potential harms of such traditional, simplifying distributional assumptions, there has been
little attention in the literature paid to better understanding the underlying distribution of
behavioral parameters. One notable contribution in this area is Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and
Epper (2010) who report evidence of heterogeneity among probability weighting
parameters among a sample of 448 subjects in Zurich and Beijing collected between
2003-2006 They cleanly (unambiguously) classify subjects into one of three distinct
groups: a minority group (roughly 20%) made up of individuals with risk attitudes
consistent with expected utility, and two subgroups of CPT-consistent individuals
(roughly 30% and 50%) among which the majority group displays a more moderately Sshaped probability weighting curve relative to the other CPT group.
One critical shortcoming of Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper’s results lie in their
elicitation method’s inability to measure a coefficient for loss aversion due to the fact that
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the menus used in their experiment contained no mixed lotteries (including both gains
and losses) and is therefore not one of the behavioral parameters included in their mixture
model. Loss aversion, however, is a crucial component of the prospect theory model that
accounts for the fact that losses are often felt with more salience than equivalent gains (in
other words, avoiding losses is preferred to acquiring similar gains). Loss aversion can
help explain much behavior deemed “irrational” by the expected utility model such as the
equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). One key implication of loss aversion
is that consumer choices often depend on whether outcomes are framed as gains or
losses. Babcock (2015) shows how the finding that farmers prefer lower crop insurance
coverage levels despite higher expected net-indemnities at higher coverage levels could
be explained by farmers framing insurance decisions/outcomes as one-off gambles
(subject to loss aversion) rather than as part of an integrated risk management strategy.
In addition, there is growing evidence of the benefits of incorporating the
principle of loss aversion into principal-agent modeling. Fryer, Levitt, List, and Sadoff
(2012) present evidence that framing merit pay for teachers in terms of losses can
improve student performance. This effect was shown to be equivalent to increasing
teacher quality by more than one standard deviation. Engström et al. (2013) find evidence
from Sweden that taxpayers are more assiduous about claiming deductions when they
owe additional taxes (at the time of filing) than when they expect a refund, suggesting
that a tax policy of over-withholding followed by rebates may increase tax revenue. This
evidence is consistent with research on the effect of rebates on consumer’s purchasing
decisions (cf., Read, 2004; Soman, 1998; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).

5

A richer understanding of how loss aversion is distributed at the population level
is also important because of its interaction with the framing of dynamic risk. Loss averse
investors who narrowly frame risky decisions/outcomes tend to make shortsighted
choices instead of adopting long-term strategies. In addition, such investors will often
ignore worthwhile (positive expectation) but risky (non-zero chance of losses) financial
opportunities, (Thaler et al., 1997; Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin, 1997) much to their
own detriment. Such behavior is explained in more detail in the numerical application
section of this article, following presentation of our estimation results.
To better understand the heterogeneous impacts of loss aversion on decisionmaking at the population level, we use the Expectation Maximization algorithm to
estimate a finite Gaussian mixture model of the distribution of CPT parameters. Our data
set is sourced from field experiments done by Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010),
involving 181 rural villagers in Vietnam, in July-August, 2005. We find evidence in
support of a 2-component mixture model in which a majority of roughly 80% of subjects
exhibit mild aversion to both risk and loss (σ =0.37, λ =1.50), while the remaining
minority of roughly 20% of subjects are classified as mildly more risk averse (σ =0.55),
but extremely loss averse (λ =9.75). As a result, estimates of average loss aversion are
pulled up dramatically by a small minority of highly loss averse individuals, a finding at
odds with the standard convention of reporting mean values of population parameters, as
in Tanaka et al. (2010) and Liu (2013), among many others.
We then use this mixture distribution to estimate allocation choices between a
high-risk and low-risk investment in the style of the classic Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman,
and Schwartz (1997) myopic loss aversion experiment and compare our results to those
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obtained using a single-component (degenerate) mixture model. We conclude with a
discussion of implications for policy and potential future research.

A prospect theory mixture model
Prospect theory is a normative model of consumer preference originally introduced by
Kahneman and Tversky in 1979 and subsequently advanced in 1992 under the name
cumulative prospect theory (CPT). It is comprised of two independent models, namely a
reference-dependent value function, coupled with a probability weighting function. It was
designed to account for the observation that i) individuals often display risk-averse
behavior when deciding amongst perceived gains while often seeking risk when potential
outcomes are perceived as losses, that ii) individuals are more affected by losses than
gains (e.g. the disutility generated by a loss of five dollars outweighs the utility derived
from a gain of five dollars), and that iii) many individuals systematically misperceive
probabilities, underweighting large probabilities while overweighting small ones.
Prospect theory replaces the standard utility function with a reference-dependent
utility function (called the value function) that allows for independent risk preferences
(curvature of the utility function) for perceived gains and losses; outcomes to the right of
an individual’s reference point are perceived as gains while outcomes to the left of the
reference point are treated as losses. This allows individuals to be risk-averse over gains
while simultaneously being risk-seeking over perceived losses, which is generally
modeled by a value function that is concave above the reference point, and convex below.
The value function also includes a loss aversion parameter, usually denoted λ , which
creates a kink at the reference point and shifts the slope of the value function in the loss
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domain to allow for the commonly observed possibility that the individual is overly
affected by losses relative to gains. Loss aversion allows even a risk neutral individual
(over both gains and losses) to be unwilling to participate in a positive expectation
gamble if the disutility felt from the loss is greater than the utility from the gain. Figure 1
depicts an example of the CPT value function.
< Figure 1 about here >
A crucial component of CPT is the probability weighting function, designed to
model the finding that individuals often overweight small probabilities while
underweighting large probabilities. Namely, behavioral responses to changes from
certainty to near-certainty are too large, and responses to changes in more balanced
probabilities (in the range of approximately 0.25 – 0.75) are too small, to be explained by
the value function alone when probabilities are weighted linearly as with expected utility.
Figure 2 shows an example of the CPT probability weighting function.
< Figure 2 about here >
The net effect of these model components is to induce what is known as the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, under which individuals are risk-seeking for smallprobability gains and large-probability losses, while being risk-averse for smallprobability losses and large-probability gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). This
pattern arises because the overweighting of small probabilities increases the
attractiveness of low-probability gains and decreases the attractiveness of low-probability
losses, while the underweighting of large probabilities makes higher-probability gains
less attractive and higher-probability losses more attractive.
We now develop a mixture model to characterize variation in risk attitudes. As

8

mentioned above, our model is designed to be applied to the data set of Tanaka et al.
(2010, herein ‘TCN’), and we therefore adopt their conventions for the underlying
behavioral model. Consider a number of distinct types of people, indexed c = 1,...,C .
Each type makes decisions under risk according to cumulative prospect theory, with typespecific parameters λc , α c and σ c . λc is the loss aversion parameter which is identified
by a kink in the value function, at the reference point separating gains and losses. α c is
the parameter describing overweighting of low probabilities in Prelec’s (1998)
axiomatically derived, compound invariant probability weighting function,

(

wc ( p ) = exp − ( ln1 p )

αc

). σ

c

is the curvature parameter for the value function, which we

assume to be consistent across both gains and losses for consistency with TCN. We
modify the TCN formulation slightly, in the fashion of Liu (2013), to make σ c
comparable to the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) from the familiar powerlaw and logarithmic expected utility functions. Specifically, we define the class-specific
value function according to:
⎧⎪( x − r )1−σ c
if x ≥ r
vc ( x ) = ⎨
1−σ c
if x < r ,
⎪⎩− λc ( r − x )

where r is the prospect theory reference point, which is commonly normalized to zero in
experimental elicitation procedures. For cases where σ c = 1 , we use ln x for the value
function according to common practice for CRRA utility.
Thus, for each class c, if we consider a prospect with two outcomes, the prospect
is valued according to

V = w ( p1 ) v ( x1 ) + (1− w ( p1 )) v ( x2 )
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for x1 x2 > 0 , where x1 > x2 is assumed without loss, or V = w ( p1 ) v ( x1 ) + w ( p2 ) x2
otherwise (that is, in the case of a ‘mixed gamble,’ when one outcome is a loss). Using
this specification, TCN outline a new methodology to experimentally estimate (or elicit)
parameters within individuals, according to the model described above. We use this
methodology to transform a data set comprised of observations of experimental choices
into a data set of observations of parameters for each individual subject, denoted λi , α i
and σ i .
We use the individual parameter estimates to fit a mixture model, with the goal of
classifying individuals into distinct types, each of which is expressed as a multivariate
normal distribution of the λ , α and σ parameters, with associated mean vector and
covariance matrix. Thus, our specification is general enough to identify heterogeneity of
risk attitudes on average across types, as well as the degree to which each type might
include relatively broad or narrow ranges of parameter values. As will be seen below, we
identify dramatic differences in loss aversion across types, but do not find as much
contrast in the marginal distributions of the other parameters.
The mixture model is fit using the well-known expectation maximization (EM)
algorithm of Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977). EM is a Bayesian procedure that uses
the likelihood function and the mixture probabilities, π c , to update so-called
‘membership probabilities,’ τ ic , for each individual i, for each type (or ‘class’) c. The
average of these membership probabilities becomes the updated mixture probability for
each class, π c , which completes the E-step (expectation) of the algorithm. In the M-step
(maximization), the updated mixture probabilities are held fixed while the log likelihood

10

is maximized by varying the parameters for each class, collectively referred to as the
vector, θ c . After the M-step, the algorithm repeats until suitable convergence is achieved.
Formally, let t denote the most recent iteration of the algorithm. Then the updated
mixture probabilities for step t + 1 are given by

τ ict+1 =

π ct ⋅ f (xi | θˆct )

∑ j=1π tj ⋅ f (xi | θˆtj )
C

,

for each class. Here, xi are the data for individual i, θˆct are the most recent maximum
likelihood estimates for the parameters describing type c, and f denotes the probability of
the data given the estimated parameters. The updated mixture probabilities for each type
(at the population level) are then simply the averages of the membership probabilities:

π ct+1 =

1 I t+1
∑ τ ic .
I i=1

The maximization step then maximizes the log-likelihood function, taking the mixture
probabilities as fixed. The updated estimate, θˆ t+1 , solves

max LL (θ ; π ) = ∑ i=1 ln
I

θ

(∑

C
c=1

)

π ct+1 ⋅ f ( xi | θ c ) .

Recall that θ c represents the parameters collectively describing the multivariate normal
for type c. Since our behavioral model is a 3-parameter model, each θ c contains three
mean parameters, as well as three additional parameters to populate the covariance
matrix, which we assume to be diagonal following Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper (2010).
The characteristics of the mixture components are not the only useful information arising
from the EM procedure. The final membership probabilities, τ ic , each represent the
posterior probability that individual i belongs to class c, a measurement which can be
used not only in maximizing the likelihood function but also in evaluating the
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performance of the mixture model as a classifier. This information is particularly useful
in cases where the number of component distributions (mixture components) is not
empirically known ex ante, because it can then be used for model selection.
The next section discusses the data set used in our Estimation section, followed by
a section covering model selection and evaluation of results.

Data
As the desire to incorporate elements of cumulative prospect theory in to economic
modeling has increased, so has the desire for accurate CPT parameter estimates at the
individual level. Obtaining such estimates poses a unique challenge to researchers for a
number of reasons. One such challenge arises from the fact that CPT parameters must be
(at least to some extent) estimated simultaneously since certainty equivalents/switching
points are a function of both risk preferences and probability weighting in the case of
non-mixed gambles, as well as by the loss aversion parameter for the case of mixed
gambles. A method that has been gaining popularity in recent years is presented in
Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010). The TCN method uses switching-points from
three pairwise lottery choice menus in the style of Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) to exactly
identify estimates of the CPT parameters within individuals.
To estimate the three CPT parameters, TCN designed three series of paired
lotteries as shown in Table 1. Each row is a choice between two binary lotteries with
probabilities expressed using bingo balls. To ensure monotonic choices, subjects are
asked at which question they would like to “switch” from Option A to option B in each
series. Once the three series (over a total of 35 choices) are complete, one of 35
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numbered balls was drawn from a bingo cage and the selected lottery was played using
10 numbered balls.
< Table 1 about here >
The menus are designed in such a way that any combination of the three choices
determines a particular interval of CPT parameter values, illustrated in Table 2. The
switching point in Series 1 and 2 are used to jointly estimate σ and α. λ is determined by
the switching point in Series 3 based on σ calculated from Series 1 and 2. Series 3 was
designed to take similar values of λ across different levels of σ, while α is differenced out
of the Series 3 calculation by setting all outcomes as equally probable.
< Table 2 about here >
TCN conducted such an experiment in July-August 2005 with 181 villagers in
rural Vietnam. Vietnam was chosen as the field site because most Vietnamese villagers
are poor but literate, so they can be easily motivated with modest financial stakes while
also comprehending experimental instructions. Their experiment lasted roughly four
hours (including survey questions and other exercises; the risk elicitation takes 20
minutes or less) and average total earnings were 174,141 dong (about 11 dollars), or
roughly 6 to 9 days’ earnings for casual unskilled labor. The data used in our analysis is
from the reported choices in the publicly available replication data provided by TCN.
Details about the distributions of parameter estimates are provided below.

Estimation and results
To allow for, and identify, heterogeneity of preferences across individuals, we estimate a
finite Gaussian mixture model on the data set of estimated prospect theory parameters
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using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm of Dempster, Laird and Rubin
(1977). A known shortcoming of the EM algorithm is that the researcher must specify the
number of mixture types. While the algorithm has some capacity to ‘zero out’
redundancies as it endogenously determines the number and nature of types, in practice,
specification of too many mixture components can lead to over-fitting. Information
criteria such as the corrected Akaike information criterion (AICc) or the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC), or comparable cross-validation approaches, are often used
for model selection but may be inadequate for choosing between mixture models due to
insufficient penalization of extra model parameters (Celeux and Soromenho, 1996;
Biernacki, Celeux and Govaert, 2000). The latter authors introduce the integrated
completed likelihood criterion (ICL), a modification of BIC with an additional penalty
for mean entropy. More entropy means more ambiguous assignments to the various
classes, corresponding to τ ic values that are not close to either zero or one, an indication
that the fitted mixture model is not serving as an effective classifier of the data into
distinct types. Thus, ICL adjusts BIC for the quality of classifications, and this quality is
conveniently measured by posterior membership probabilities estimated in the course of
the EM procedure. Table 3 shows estimates for AICc, BIC and ICL, for models fitted
with up to four mixture components.
< Table 3 about here >
Table 3 shows two things: first, all three selection criteria indicate that a mixture
of at least two components is preferred to a model of only one component distribution.
This helps justify the mixture model approach. Second, both BIC and ICL indicate that
adding components beyond two does not result in enough additional information to
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justify the inclusion of the extra parameters in the model (note that the values are only
comparable within columns, not across them, and that lower is better). However, the
AICc results do not agree with the other two criteria. While criticisms of AICc’s
consistency (vs. BIC) exist as mentioned above, we cannot rule out AICc out of hand
because the literature remains divided as to whether or when BIC outperforms AIC/AICc,
especially in cases where BIC is likely to under-fit models in finite samples (Burnham
and Anderson, 2004).
To address this issue, we plot the distributions of posterior membership
probabilities for the 2-component model and the 4-component model in Figure 3 and
Figure 4, respectively. We also show classification statistics in Table 4 for each of the 2component and 4-component fitted mixture models. The τ ic ≥ 0.99 column gives the
number of observations (and percent of the total) that exhibit τ ic ≥ 0.99 for at least one
class, c, indicating a posterior probability of membership in a single class of at least 99%.
The 95% and 90% columns are defined similarly. It is apparent that the 2-component
model dramatically outperforms the 4-component model in terms of assigning
observations to genuinely distinct types. For this reason, along with a preference for a
more parsimonious model barring strong evidence to the contrary, we consider the 2component model estimates as our primary results. Still, we contrast it against the 1component (degenerate mixture) model and the 4-component model in the numerical
application following this section. The 2-component model captures critical type
information that a single component distribution cannot distinguish, while at the same
time providing near identical information to the higher resolution 4-component model in
terms of the implied distribution over risky choices in the population.
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< Figure 3 about here >
< Figure 4 about here >
< Table 4 about here >
Figures 3 and 4, and Table 4 all show that the more parsimonious 2-component
mixture model is also a more effective classifier on our data set. We can see that the 2component mixture encodes substantially more population level information than a
single-component model, but the 4-mixture does not add much information beyond what
is captured with two components. Figure 5 demonstrates this fact by plotting the marginal
kernel densities across each of the prospect theory parameters for each fitted model.
< Figure 5 about here >
Figure 5 also demonstrates our key finding, enabled by the mixture modeling
approach: the right-hand panel (for the loss aversion parameter, λ ) shows that the
average level of loss aversion is not as informative as population level statistics for the
other prospect theory parameters because it is not a typical level of loss aversion. Our
estimated model shows that almost 20% of the population are extremely loss averse
(Group I), with estimated parameters centered around λ = 9.75 , while over 80% of the
population (Group II) have loss aversion levels in a range centered on λ = 1.50 , lower
than the classical value of λ = 2.25 reported by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and used
ubiquitously ever since. The population-level marginal distribution arising from the
mixture is clearly bimodal, and the population-average value of λ = 2.91 is 1.29 standard
deviations above the mean for the majority group (Group II), yet it is 5.32 standard
deviations below the mean for the extremely loss averse minority group (Group I).
< Table 5 about here >

16

Table 5 shows our estimation results for the 2-component mixture model. The key,
separating feature between the two groups is loss aversion, with little overlap between
groups indicating a clean separation by virtue of the EM algorithm acting as an effective
classifier. We note that the extremely loss averse group is on average more risk averse
(by this we mean a higher curvature parameter, σ ), but the distributions of this parameter
have near-identical support across the two groups in our sample. All estimated model
parameters were statistically significantly different between Group I and Group II at the
99.9% level, except for the standard deviation parameter for the marginal distribution of
the probability weighting parameter, α (p=0.089).
We also note that the two groups appear to be nearly identical with respect to the
probability weighting parameter, α , a finding that at first glace appears to stand in
contrast to the results of Bruhin et al. (2010), who identify groups primarily based on
differences in probability weighting behavior. Both their experimental methods and
behavioral model differ from ours, however, in that their data set contains many more
observations per subject, allowing for a richer model of probability weighting that
includes the two-parameter weighting function of Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) which
differentiates between the function’s “curvature” and “elevation” and has been shown to
account well for individual heterogeneity (Wu, Zhang, and Gonzalez, 2004). Still, this
contrast probably merits further research. Figure 6 shows the fitted 2-component mixture
model overlaid on a histogram of parameter estimates for each of the prospect theory
parameters. The bimodal distribution of loss aversion parameters is clearly visible.
< Figure 6 about here >
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We thank a referee for pointing out that intuitively our results regarding extreme
loss aversion classify a percentage of the population as having an “essentially inverse Lshaped” value function, which might be considered a form of extreme risk aversion. To
check whether this intuition would hold in an expected utility setting, we re-ran our
analysis with un-weighted probabilities and a constant relative risk aversion utility
function with parameter r fitted by maximum likelihood. First, we found no “separation”
in the parameter values when applying our goodness of fit criteria for mixture models as
above: the ICL criterion dramatically preferred no mixture to any mixture with C > 1
components. Second, we found that the maximum likelihood estimate of r under expected
utility was a better predictor (via OLS) of the sigma curvature parameter (adjusted R2 =
0.613) than of the lambda loss aversion parameter (adjusted R2 = 0.311). Both
regressions had constant terms and coefficient estimates significant at the 99.9% level,
but the regression for sigma had t-statistics approximately 1.5 times larger in magnitude.
Finally, we found that the TCN lambda parameter was uncorrelated with the root mean
squared error of the fitted estimate r, so noise in the data does not explain the lack of
replication in an expected utility setting. We conclude that the intuitive observation of an
inverse L-shaped value function does not translate directly to a mixture with an extreme
risk aversion group under expected utility, likely because of probability weights being an
essential component of the CPT model.

Application: myopic loss aversion and investment
Myopic loss aversion (MLA) is the behavioral phenomenon used to explain the equity
premium puzzle, and it is responsible for misallocation of retirement and investment
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portfolios worldwide (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Its name refers to the combined
effect/result of loss aversion and narrow framing. Narrow framing is a key concept from
the mental accounting literature (Thaler, 1999) that refers to how decisions and outcomes
are aggregated (framed) both cross-sectionally (across simultaneous outcomes) and intertemporally (across consecutive outcomes). Loss averse investors who narrowly frame
risky decisions/outcomes tend to make shortsighted choices instead of adopting long-term
strategies. In addition, as stated earlier, such investors will often ignore worthwhile
(positive expectation) but risky (non-zero chance of losses) financial opportunities, much
to their own detriment. Narrow framing of decisions and narrow framing of outcomes
tend generally tend to go together, and it is the combination of both tendencies that
defines a myopic investor (Thaler et al., 1997).
Put another way, the myopia component of MLA leads to improperly aggregating
a sequence of investments or positive-expectation bets over time, leading to inflated
perceptions of the potential for, and probability of, losses occurring. These perceptions
interact with loss aversion, in which losses are felt more strongly than equal-sized gains,
to cause investors to avoid opportunities that they would take over longer time horizons.
The MLA phenomenon has been extensively verified in experimental settings, and has
even been found in professional futures traders (Haigh and List, 2005).
The behavioral literature has also identified cross-sectional and inter-temporal
forms of myopia. In the case where two coin flips are carried out simultaneously, a
failure to aggregate over the two independent outcomes is an example of cross-sectional
myopia. Another example of cross-sectional myopia is found in the experimental results
of Benjamin, Rabin and Raymond (2016) who model “non-belief in the law of large
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numbers,” a phenomenon in which individuals fail to account for the changing statistical
properties of aggregated, independent random variables. For example, individuals might
use something like a mistaken proportionality heuristic when they assume that the
probability of seven or more heads in ten coin flips (17.2%) is about equal to the
probability of 70 or more heads in 100 coin flips (0.003%). In the case of consecutive
coin flips, such a failure would be an example of inter-temporal myopia, which is directly
related to the frequency with which decisions or outcomes are evaluated. Since the
probability of observing a loss is higher when outcomes (e.g. stock returns) are evaluated
more frequently, the utility experienced from owning stocks will be lower for more
myopic loss averse investors (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin, 1997) who should be
expected over time to gravitate towards lower levels of risk (Thaler, et al., 1997).
To demonstrate the importance of the heterogeneity we have identified in the loss
aversion parameter, we conduct a numerical exercise based on the experimental setting
used to evaluate myopic loss aversion (MLA) in Thaler et al. (1997). Their experiment is
essentially a fund management exercise where subjects need to allocate their portfolios
between a simulated equity fund designed to resemble the returns profile of the S&P 500,
and a simulated bond fund designed to resemble the returns profile of 5-year treasuries. If
subjects are myopic and loss averse, then the setup predicts that the feedback frequency
will affect their allocation between the two funds: they are not told which is which, and
more frequent monitoring will expose them to relatively more losses in stocks, triggering
more loss averse subjects to allocate more heavily towards bonds.
Fundamentally, the myopic loss aversion result is about the effect of loss aversion
on a distribution of investment returns over time – due to myopia, the subjects do not
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realize the statistical properties of aggregating positive-expectation gambles, and so do
not realize that they can commit for longer periods than the assigned experimental
feedback frequency. Thaler et al. assign subjects to be able to adjust their portfolios as
frequently as every month, or as infrequently as every five years. Theory suggests a fiveyear adjustment frequency is likely to be sufficiently long to inhibit the effects of loss
aversion (by lowering the probability of a loss in the equities fund), an estimate that we
confirm in our numerical exercise below.
However, a key distinction we find is that the majority of the population (Group
II) is far less affected by loss aversion, and are induced to optimal long-term investment
(100% allocated to stocks, in this example) by adjustment frequencies of one year or less.
The contrast of optimal one-year adjustments vs. five-year adjustments is a striking result
made possible by our estimation of heterogeneity in a mixture model. In their original
work identifying myopic loss aversion as a possible cause of the equity premium puzzle,
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) hypothesize that while theory predicts five-year adjustment
periods to be optimal for investment planning in the face of MLA, the equity premium
puzzle is likely observed in part because investors need to evaluate their portfolios at
least once per year at tax time, and many evaluate at least quarterly due to the common
practice of quarterly statements being issued. Our results suggest that a disproportionate
share of the MLA effect of under-allocation of investments to stocks is due to a relatively
small share of the population operating under extreme loss aversion.
To apply our results in an MLA setting, we use the experimental setup of Thaler
et al. who calibrate quarterly log returns of the S&P 500 to be 2% with a 5% standard
deviation (these are intended to be real returns), and quarterly log returns of the bond
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fund to be 0.5% with a 0.25% standard deviation. To enable comparison with their results
we apply a linear loss aversion model in which probability weights and value function
curvature are ignored. Figure 7 shows the effect of linear loss aversion on the implied
distribution of stock returns, using a loss aversion coefficient of λ = 2.25 and Thaler et
al.’s (1997) calibrated returns distribution, at different feedback frequencies. The Figure
clearly shows how loss averse investors would experience dramatically more losses in
shorter time frames, and so might shy away from allocating investments to the stock
market if they weight losses more heavily than gains of equal size.
< Figure 7 about here >
Table 6 shows summary statistics for the simulated distribution of cumulative 30year investment returns under MLA, broken down by group (from our estimated 2component mixture model) and by feedback frequency. The majority group (Group I)
with standard prospect theory parameters achieves dramatically higher returns at nearly
every feedback frequency, and notably, achieves maximum returns at the one-year
frequency. The extreme loss aversion group (Group II), on the other hand, dramatically
over-allocates to the bond fund and does not even double their money on average over a
30-year horizon if feedback is given at a quarterly or higher frequency. For any (perhaps,
“libertarian paternalistic”) interventions that might be considered, the extreme loss
aversion group should clearly be targeted, as they appear to bear the bulk of the harm that
comes from MLA-influenced investment.
< Table 6 about here >
We can also use this numerical exercise to show how researchers ignoring the
possibility of a mixture model might be misled by using population-average parameter
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measures for inference, or to guide policy. In particular, we compare the degenerate, 1component mixture model estimated above against results from the 2-component model
presented here. Because the 1-component model cannot account for the bimodal nature of
loss aversion in the population, the average, typical individual in the 1-component model
is definitely not typical under the 2-component mixture. The effect of this
mischaracterization is to overstate the effects of MLA with more frequent feedback but to
understate its importance when feedback is infrequent. This can be seen in Figure 8,
which shows the allocation percentage to stocks over a simulated population from each
model. The single-component model overstates the effect of MLA for feedback
frequencies from weekly up to semi-annually, but then understates the effect of MLA for
longer feedback frequencies.
< Figure 8 about here >
Effectively, then, an applied researcher using a single-component model would
predict that loss aversion is more important of a decision factor to the bulk of the
population than it actually is. The majority group exhibits only mild loss aversion,
experiences relatively mild effects on investment outcomes, and converges to optimal
behavior over shorter time frames than would be predicted using the population average
loss aversion estimate. On the other hand, Group I (extremely loss averse) experiences
severe effects on their investment outcomes and are much more resistant to lengthening
the feedback window. It is not depicted in Figure 8, but Group I’s allocations converge
sharply towards optimal allocations between the one- and two-year feedback intervals.

Discussion
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In this article, we have shown how modeling heterogeneity is a critical piece of applied
behavioral modeling. Namely, while we find little variation across prospect theory
‘types’ in terms of risk aversion (curvature of the value function) and probability
weighting, we find dramatic variation across types in terms of the level of estimated loss
aversion. Approximately twenty percent of our sample is classified as extremely loss
averse in a parsimonious, 2-component finite Gaussian mixture model. While about
eighty percent of the population is classified as mildly loss averse, researchers ignoring
this heterogeneity structure would instead assume that moderate loss aversion is typical,
because of how much the extremely loss averse group drags up the average parameter
estimate. Our results show that moderate loss aversion, while average in terms of
estimated loss aversion parameters, actually applies to only ten or twenty percent of the
population depending on how it is defined.
We extend these findings in a numerical simulation exercise using the myopic
loss aversion investment model of Thaler et al. (1997). The effect of myopia, when
combined with loss aversion, is to cause investors to avoid worthwhile risky investments
in favor of safer ones with almost no real returns, especially when they consider their
investment decisions over shorter and shorter time frames. When we use the fitted
mixture model in the simulation, we find that longer investment feedback frequencies
mitigate the effects of loss aversion, but in a manner slightly different than expected.
Namely, for the majority group of individuals classified as mildly loss averse, we find
that lengthening investment feedback intervals to only one year corrects the myopic loss
aversion investment problem entirely, and their investment losses for shorter feedback
intervals are relatively minor relative to those of the extremely loss averse group. For the
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minority group, lengthening feedback intervals has relatively little effect on their
investment allocations up to one year, but they then experience a discontinuous jump
where their allocations converge to those of the majority group for intervals of two years
or longer.
Overall, our results highlight the importance of heterogeneity in applied
modeling, and of considering the possibility of discrete behavioral types within the
population. A promising area of future applied research in agricultural finance and risk
modeling is to extend of our results to the crop insurance domain. In a recent article,
Babcock (2015) used a prospect theory model to show evidence that U.S. farmers’ crop
insurance adoptions likely arise from myopic treatment of crop insurance payouts as a
standalone investment. If farmers come from distinct types with respect to loss aversion,
then this will figure dramatically into their choices of coverage levels and acreage
enrolled in the program. Since crop insurance subsidies are the primary mechanism for
transferring income to the U.S. farm sector, the heterogeneity we have identified implies
there will be winners and losers among American farmers, driven by their preferences for
risk and loss. With crop insurance premiums reaching $11.1 billion in 2012 and with
average premium subsidies above 60%, whether or how crop insurance rates might be
structured to mitigate effects on extremely loss averse farmers is a policy question of
national importance.
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Tables
Table 1. Three Series of Pairwise Lotteries (in 1,000 dong) from Tanaka et al. (2010)
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Table 2. Switching-point Based Parameter Estimates

Question at which preference switches from Option A to Option B, and approximations of α , σ and λ .
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Table 3. Information criteria for model selection
Components
1
2
3
4

AICc
1100.89
872.88
853.43
840.70

BIC
1120.01
914.23
916.92
926.23

ICL
560.01
542.82
637.31
691.56
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Table 4. Quality of posterior classification
Components

Obs.

τ ic ≥ 0.99

τ ic ≥ 0.95

τ ic ≥ 0.90

2
4

181
181

179 (98.90%)
35 (19.34%)

181 (100.0%)
56 (30.94%)

181 (100.0%)
78 (43.09%)
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Table 5. Estimation Results for the 2-Component Mixture

Weight

α
σ
λ

Group I
Extreme Loss Aversion
0.1713

Group II
Typical CPT
0.8287

(0.0291)

(0.0291)

Mean
0.7728

Std
0.2722

Mean
0.7400

Std
0.2575

(0.0488)

(0.0183)

(0.0208)

(0.0091)

0.5505

0.4443

0.3726

0.3012

(0.0795)

(0.0286)

(0.0248)

(0.0091)

9.7542

(0.4159)
Note: standard errors are in parenthesis.

1.2862

1.5007

1.0964

(1.3960)

(0.0991)

(0.1634)
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Table 6. Simulated 30-year Investment Returns under Myopic Loss Aversion

Feedback
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Annually
5-Yearly

Group I
Extreme Loss Averse
Mean
Std Dev
84.61%
86.67%
96.62%
171.58%
1180.69%

5.07%
5.22%
6.87%
33.14%
757.51%

Group II
Standard CPT
Mean
Std Dev
537.26%
671.50%
914.47%
1180.33%
1180.69%

313.77%
403.11%
567.88%
757.21%
757.51%
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Figures

Figure 1. The Prospect Theory Value Function

36

Figure 2. The Probability Weighting Function
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Figure 3. Posterior membership probabilities (2-Mixture)
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Figure 4. Posterior membership probabilities (4-Mixture)
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Figure 5. Marginal Kernel Densities by Model and by Parameter
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Figure 6. Histograms and Mixture Densities by Parameter (2-Mixture)
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Figure 7. Effect of Linear Loss Aversion on Implied Equities Returns
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Figure 8. Investment Allocations by Feedback Frequency: 1-Mixture vs. 2-Mixture
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